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Why Is Housing Finance Still Stuck in Such a Primitive Stage?
By ROBERT J. SHILLER

Modern financial theory suggests some fundamental modifications to the institutions
supporting housing, and yet nothing fundamental has happened to the standard mortgage contract
between the homeowner and originator since the long-term fixed-rate self-amortizing mortgage
was widely adopted in the U.S. in the 1930s, replacing the then-standard 3-5-year balloonpayment mortgage (Bartlett 1989, Green and Wachter, 2005). The U.S. mortgage industry has
maintained this type of mortgage despite the mathematical finance revolution of the second half
of the twentieth century, which suggests many important innovations.

I. Reasons for Slowness of Innovation in Mortgage Finance
There are quite a number of reasons why technology for homeownership has progressed
more slowly than in other areas.
Experimentation with new mortgage forms is costly since it must deal directly with the broad
public, creating costs of publicity, battles with regulators, and risks of lawsuits. The benefits of
the experimentation are usually public goods, available to other mortgage originators, so benefits
to innovators do not defray the experimentation costs. While financial patents have been awarded
in the United States since the 1990s, they are weak because prior art may be impossible to
ascertain until after the costly experimentation has gone on long enough to prove the value of the
innovation.
Experimentation with long-term financial innovations such as mortgages may take a lifetime
to prove itself completely.
Any new markets associated with the innovation will not get liquidity for such a long time,
and hence may not even get started.
Mistrust by the general public of the financial community encourages the use of boilerplate
mortgage contracts, virtually the same for all. The consumer thereby knows that he or she is
getting the same treatment as others. This discourages mortgage contracts tailored to individual
needs.
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Public attention is episodic: no attention is paid to some potential rare big events until they
actually happen. A tendency to think in terms of historical determinism leads people to think that
exigencies of the past will not repeat themselves, and they tend even to forget about these
events, rather than prepare for repeats of them. Financial crises of historic importance may spur
institutional change, but only in the crisis countries, leaving observers puzzled later why some
countries have an innovation and others do not.
Selection bias may compromise experimentation that would work better if the innovation
were widely adopted. This is especially significant for products as important as mortgages,
which attract focused attention because of their importance, and early adopters of innovative new
mortgage forms may have special circumstances or exploitative motivations.
Innovators in financial institutions have no incentive to consider externalities, of course. The
citizenship externality, that homeownership seems to encourage a public spirit, is well known.
Externalities must also be considered in other behavioral terms. A well-designed mortgage may
for example serve as a stimulus to saving, to get over the myopic tendency to postpone saving,
for it puts people on a routine schedule of regular payments on principal, but mortgage
originators do not profit from this benefit. The saving incentive is weakened by the lack of
homeowner mortgage risk management.
The importance of mortgages as incentives to save is a relatively recent phenomenon, and
hence still not part of mortgage lore. A century ago, people did not have as much incentive to
save for retirement because they did not expect to live to retire, and few saved for their children’s
college because few even went to college. Changes like these cause changes in ideal mortgage
contracts which may be difficult to motivate to the public.
Sophisticated innovations that rely on data sources, such as home price indices, cannot be
implemented until the accurate indices are publicly provided, and with enough history to permit
understanding the properties of the data. There is a chicken-egg problem: index providers may
not have an incentive to supply them suitable for contract settlement until there are contracts that
demand it, and so contracts do not have the index to get started.
Advantages that lie in the realm of behavioral economics may be poorly understood. For
example, it was not until the behavioral economics revolution of the 1990s that many people
fully understood that many people would benefit from a nudge to save.
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II. The Widespread Adoption in the U.S. of Long-Term Self-Amortizing Mortgages
While before the 1930s some U.S. lenders, particularly building and loans, issued longterm self-amortizing mortgages, also called installment mortgages or level-payment mortgages,
they were not the standard. That they were rare then may seem a mystery today, but clearly
people did not see the need for any such thing until the first U.S. national housing crisis came
1925-33, and U.S. home prices fell 30% at the same time that unemployment rose from 4.9% to
23.4%.
The self-amortizing mortgage had had some unfortunate association with installment credit
which proliferated for consumer durables starting in the 1880s. Jokingly called “consumptive
credit,” and associated with sleazy operations and door-to-door salesmen, it was criticized as
abusive since it made ownership look too easy and encouraged excessive indebtedness (Calder,
1999).
Upton Sinclair’s 1906 book muckraking book The Jungle has its protagonist Jurgis signing a
contract to buy a house with a $300 down payment and 100 monthly $12 installment payments.
After he unavoidably missed some monthly payments, he lost not only the house but also claim
to the downpayment and all monthly payments he had already made.
It took the intervention of the government to bring long-term self-amortizing mortgages to a
new standard that was respected and trusted by the public.
Before the financial crisis of the 1930s, there seemed to be no major problem with the
balloon-payment.. Homeowners who missed payments could always sell the property and pocket
home equity, then could rent, and there was no stigma in renting then, as most people were
renters, could try again later. There was no significant national nominal home price decline in the
U.S. between 1890 and 1925, and so there seemed little risk of homeowners becoming
underwater (just as there was no such decline between 1950 and 2000, before the recent crisis).

III. Price-Level-Adjusted Mortgages
Under the pressure of high inflation, starting in the 1970s, the economics profession seemed
to develop a consensus that hedging instruments for CPI risk should be created. Milton Friedman
wrote in February 1984: “Any individual entering into a contract for a future date could hedge
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himself against inflation uncertainty...” Paul Samuelson wrote that the then-new CPI-W futures
contract at the Coffee Sugar and Cocoa Exchange makes “a valuable new contribution in
permitting hedges against unforeseeable variability in rates of inflation.”
The price-level-adjusted mortgage (PLAM) was introduced in the early 1980s, and had some
serious advocacy: Modigliani and Lessard (1984).
But both CPI futures and the PLAMS have fizzled, even though inflation uncertainty
remains. The failure reflects some of the principles outlined in Section I. above.

IV. Mortgages Managing Housing Capital Risks
Shared appreciation mortgages (SAMs), which offered some risk management of home price
appreciation, were offered by the Bank of Scotland and Bear Stearns in the 1990s, but acquired a
damaged reputation with the boom in home prices. U.K. homeowners who took such mortgages,
and lost out on the speculative gains, were so angered that they filed a class-action lawsuit
against the issuers. The suit was dropped, but the reputation loss was permanent.
The housing market partnership was advocated by Andrew Caplin, Sewin Chan, Charles
Freeman and Joseph Tracy (1994), which would allow homeowners to sell part of their home to
investors, thereby lessening their own home price risks.
I have proposed (2008) the creation of continuous workout mortgages (CWMs), which have
a preplanned workout procedure that constantly adjusts mortgage balance and payments to an
index of local home prices. By tying workouts to an index, rather than the own home price, a
moral hazard problem is solved.
With Rafal Wojakowski, Mark Shackleton and M. Shahid Ebrahim, we have worked out
some of the pricing issues (2013a) and have done a simulation that reveals substantial welfare
gain to creating autormatic workout mortgages (AWMs) (2013b).
These mortgages might be combined with housing partnerships to get part of the benefit of
both: both specificity to the home’s own risks and reduced moral hazard.
There has been some questioning of the assumption that insuring homeowners against a
decline in home value is a good thing. Sinai and Soulelis (2014) have written that the existing
mortgage institutions may be close to optimal given that people want to live in their house
forever, or move to a similar house whose price is correlated with the present house, and so are
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perfectly hedged. But their paper cannot be exactly right, given the sense of distress that
homeowners are experiencing who are underwater. They are more certainly not right about all
homeowners, many of whom actually plan to sell their home when they retire.
There is an emerging trend in the United States and other countries, even in the emerging
world, towards elderly people finishing their years in continuing care retirement communities
(CCRCs). Today, 65% to 75% of U.S. CCRCs ask prospective tenants, in addition for a monthly
fee, to an upfront entry fee, when they enter the facility, which allows them to guarantee that no
one is evicted for running out of money. The average fee in the U.S. in 2010 was $248,000, close
to the median price of an existing home (CCRC Task Force, 2010). The decline in home values
with the financial crisis thus caused a CCRC vacancy crisis.
The CCRC crisis is mending itself with rising home prices, but must not be forgotten, for it
reflects a fundamental problem.

V. Steps Forward
Derivative markets for owner-occupied homes, which might have facilitated the issuance of
mortgage risk management contracts, at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange in 2006 and at the
Chicago Board Options Exchange in 2012, and in other markets, faced numerous obstacles to
success, see Fabozzi et al. (2010). Markets like these might yet catch on, supported by such
innovations as the new REO-to-rental securitizations demonstrated by the Blackstone Group in
late 2013.
The difficulties in making improvements in mortgage institutions have to do with the
complexity of the risk management problem, coupled with mistrust of institutional players. The
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, created by the Dodd-Frank Act and having authority
over mortgages, among other things, seems oriented towards addressing complaints from the
public, and has focused its attention so far on such things as unfair collection practices, bias
against minorities, and excessive complexity of financial products being used to confuse
customers. These are laudable concerns, but complaints that economists might register about the
fundamental success of mortgage products to serve risk management well have not yet taken
center stage.
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There is an important role for government support of research as a public good that improves
our understanding of the basic risk management problem that people face in their housing tenure
decisions. Alternative forms of mortgage need to be studied on a scientific basis. The New
Development economics, Karlan and Appel (2011), Bannerjee and Duflo (2012) has shown how
carefully controlled experiments can reveal solid steps to take regarding new financial
institutions for poverty reduction. The same methods could be used to improve mortgage
institutions, as well as rental, leasing, partnership and cooperative institutions, in advanced
countries.
It is important to subsidize applied research in behavioral economics, on perceptions of risk
and on myopia concerning risks, relevant to understanding why the public does not demand
better risk management with their mortgages.
Governments should also subsidize research on measuring risk factors relevant to housing
tenure, possibly using procedures such as hedonic repeated-measure home price indices (Shiller
1993) for quality and narrow geographical subsets of the market, and consistently-formulated
international home price indices.
Governments also should subsidize fee-only financial advisers for everyone, so that they can
get mortgage advice from other than just salespeople with vested interests.
We need also to explore how to promote better use of our blossoming information
technology, which makes possible vastly more complexity while retaining user friendliness.

REFERENCES
Banerjee, Abhijit, and Esther Duflo. 2012. Poor Economics: A Radical Rethinking of the Way to
Fight Global Poverty. Public Affairs.
Bartlett, William W. 1989. Mortgage-Backed Securities: Products, Analysis, Trading. New
Jersey: Prentice Hall.
Calder, Lendol Glen. 1999. Financing the American Dream: A Cultural History of Consumer
Credit. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Caplin, Andrew, Sewin Chan, Charles Freeman and Joseph Tracy. 1997. Housing Partnerships:
A New Approach to a Market at a Crossroads, Cambridge MA: MIT Press.

7

CCRC Task Force, Jane Zarem Editor. 2010. Today’s Continuing Care Retirement Community
(CCRC).
Washington,
D.C.:
American
Seniors
Housing
Association.
http://www.seniorshousing.org/filephotos/research/CCRC_whitepaper.pdf.
Fabozzi, Frank, Robert J. Shiller and Radu Tunaru. 2010. “Hedging Real Estate Risk.” Journal
of Portfolio Management, 35(5):92-103
Green, Richard K., and Susan M. Wachter. 2005. “The American Mortgage in Historical and
International Context,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19(4):93-114.
Henderson, J. Vernon and Yannis Ioannides. 1983. “A Model of Housing Tenure Choice.”
American Economic Review, 73(1):98-113.
Karlan, Dean and Jacob Appel. 2011. More than Good Intentions: How a New Economics is
Helping to Solve Global Poverty. Dutton.
Lessard, Donald R., and Franco Modigliani, “Inflation and the Housing Market: Problems and
Potential Solutions, http://www.bostonfed.org/economic/conf/conf14/conf14c.pdf in New
Mortgage Designs for an Inflationary Environment, Conference Series 14, Federal Reserve Bank
of Boston,
Shiller, Robert J. 1993. Macro Markets: Creating Institutions for Managing Society’s Largest
Economic Risks. New York: Oxford University Press.
________, 2003. New Financial Order: Risk in the 21st Century. Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
__________, 2008. Subprime Solution: How Today’s Global Financial Crisis Happened and
What to Do about It. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Shiller, Robert, Rafal Wojakowski, M. Shahid Ebrahim and Mark B. Shackleton, 2013.
“Mitigating Financial Fragility with Continuous Workout Mortgages.” Journal of Economic
Behavior and Organization 85:269-85.
__________, “Automatic Workout Mortgage and Housing Consumption Choice.” Unpublished
working paper, New Haven: Yale University.
Sinai, Todd, and Nick Soulelis, 2014. “Can Owning a Home Hedge the Risk of Moving?”
forthcoming, American Economic Journal, Economic Policy.

8

